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Abstract  
Individual investors often do not have access to share trading information and even if they do, they may 
not be able to understand or accurately interpret this information. Investors rely on financial analysts’ 
forecasts and stock recommendations in order to make profitable investment decisions. The role of the 
financial analyst is an important one with two key objectives: earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations (Loh and Mian 2006). These financial analysts play a significant role in the efficient 
functioning of global stock markets.  
The aim of the financial analyst is to evaluate shares trading on the stock market and their future price 
appreciation or depreciation to develop new buy, hold or sell recommendations to maximize shareholder 
wealth. The extant literature recognizes that new buy, hold and sell recommendations made by financial 
analysts have a substantial impact on the market (Womack, 1996). Research on financial analysts has 
become prevalent in financial literature with the promotion of financial analysts to the level of integral 
economic proxies worthy of individual examination (Bradshaw, 2011). 
The aim of this research report is to investigate whether financial analysts’ stock recommendations 
enhance or destruct shareholder wealth. The extant literature on financial analysts’ stock 
recommendations and forecasts suggests that the analysts’ recommendations have both a significant and 
an insignificant effect on stock prices in the market following the months after the change in 
recommendation is made. The accuracy of the financial analysts’ stock recommendations are measured 
in the months following the change in recommendation through determining if the recommendation 
outperforms the market benchmark.  
This report examines the effects of analysts’ recommendations on the performance of stocks on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and concludes through determining if the share underperforms or 
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outperforms the market benchmark surmising that to a varying degree there is value to be found in 
financial analysts’ stock recommendations for the individual investor.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the research problem followed by section 1.2 
which examines the context of the study. Section 1.3 discusses the research problem. Section 1.4 defines 
the research questions and section 1.5 debates the significance of the study. Finally, section 1.6 concludes 
with the organization of the thesis. 
1.2 Context of study 
Described as the eyes and ears of the market (Martinez 2008) the role of the financial analyst focusses 
largely on the production of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. The value of the financial 
analyst is derived from their stock picking abilities and aptitude to accurately assess current market trends 
resulting in favourable returns for the investor based on new buy, sell or hold recommendations (Loh and 
Mian, 2006). Financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations aim to provide investors with 
significant market information in anticipation of increased future cash flows. The extant literature draws 
on a number of issues relating to the role of financial analysts in the stock market. These issues relate to: 
one, the financial analysts ability to predict the future performance of the stock. Two, the analysts’ conflict 
of interest and the role of incentives in financial analysts’ work, and three, the stock market’s reaction to 
financial analysts’ stock recommendations. 
Marsden, Veeraraghavan and Ye (2008) suggest financial analysts typically review all financial and 
economic information provided by companies and spend a substantial amount of time and effort on 
forecasting and providing future stock recommendations to individual investors.  Despite the effort placed 
on the assessment of all available market information by the analyst, it is not always possible to obtain 
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and accurately examine all of the information accessible in the market before proposing new buy, hold or 
sell recommendations (Marsden, Veeraraghavan & Ye, 2008).  
Financial markets are assumed to be information efficient allowing analysts to produce accurate forecasts 
and recommendations, but not efficient to the extent that all available information is reflected in the stock 
price refuting the role of the financial analyst in the market. Should prediction error occur and result 
negatively upon the individual investor, the debate continues whether this inaccuracy is made 
unintentionally based upon incorrect market information or whether there is an evident conflict of 
interest impacting the output of the financial analyst in question.  
There has been increasing attention from researchers and investors on the possible bias surrounding 
financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations. Schipper (1991) refers to the purposeful sway 
of market data in the direction of new buy, hold or sell recommendations as positive forecast bias 
suggesting that financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations are influenced heavily by 
financial incentive. Marsden, Veeraraghavan and Ye (2008) suggest that financial analysts are aware that 
their forecasts and stock recommendations may be biased upwards in order to issue optimistic results to 
meet and service the needs of brokerage firms to maintain positive relationships with the firms they 
report on.  It is therefore assumed that financial analysts’ provide recommendations to investors in 
support of a particular stock not because of its potential growth factor, but because they have received 
financial incentive in favour of a particular recommendation. This type of bias could result negatively upon 
the reputation and legitimacy of the financial analyst should it be uncovered.  
Financial analysts need to maintain their reputation to uphold investor confidence and report truthful 
results based on all available market information (Cheng, Liu and Qian, 2006). The need for accurate stock 
recommendations remains as research demonstrates that financial analysts exert a great influence on 
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stock prices indicating that superior stock recommendations outperform inferior stock recommendations 
as discussed by Loh and Mian (2006). 
The extant literature examines the proficient processing of information by the financial analyst in the 
market and shows that it facilitates efficient stock price setting as discussed by Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler 
and Agarwal (2009) and Beaver (2002). The reaction of the market to financial analysts’ stock 
recommendations suggests that financial analysts are significant in the efficient functioning of stock 
markets (Mokoleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal 2009). The stock recommendations made by financial 
analysts affect investor sentiment resulting in buy, hold and sell motions by the individual investor 
dependent on the stock recommendation made by the financial analyst. The assessment of the accuracy 
and effect of these results is necessary due to the role played by the financial analyst in the market and 
the impact their recommendations have on investors and stock prices.  
Investors rely on market information provided by financial analysts’ in the form of forecasts and stock 
recommendations to make their investment decisions. It is therefore imperative that these forecasts and 
stock recommendations are accurate. Given the amount of compensation received by financial analysts, 
one could safely assume that their outputs are considered accurate and beneficial to investors, but are 
they? Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009) discuss the possibility that there is a loss of 
neutrality by the analyst in stock coverage decisions and forecasts based upon salary structure and 
incentives.  
Financial analysts are rewarded handsomely for profitable stock recommendations by firms. The typical 
remuneration package received by a financial analyst is defined by Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and 
Agarwal (2009) and includes a base salary, a percentage of the investment deals processed and the trading 
volume generated. This inflated compensation structure may result in bias driven by self-gain and a lack 
of objectivity by the financial analyst. Hong and Kubik (2003) found that financial analysts are judged less 
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on the accuracy of their forecasts and stock recommendations suggesting that the compensation received 
by the financial analyst is therefore not necessarily based on the quality and legitimacy of their research 
but rather the preferred impact their results have on the market.  
Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009) address concerns surrounding the accuracy of financial 
analyst’s earnings forecasts and stock recommendations appearing overly optimistic and not reflective of 
the factual performance of the stock’s value. Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009) elaborate 
the claims that financial analysts’ forecasts and stock coverage results are predetermined 
recommendations driven by incentives. Bradshaw (2011) adds to this through his research suggesting that 
financial analysts’ behaviour in the market is dominated by conflicts of interest such as monetary 
remuneration and not the accurateness of their results.  
There are a number of predefined factors that affect the accuracy of financial analysts’ stock 
recommendations and forecasts. The aim of this report is to investigate whether financial analysts’ 
recommendations in emerging markets like South Africa create value for investors. Thus, do buy 
recommendations outperform the benchmark in the foreseeable future, and do sell recommendations 
underperform the benchmark in the foreseeable future?  
1.3 Research problem 
The most precise way in which to understand the role of financial analysts in the market is to examine the 
outputs provided by these analysts to the market and investors. Financial analysts examine market trends 
to provide investors with accurate stock recommendations and forecasts. Loh and Mian (2006) found that 
the financial analysts that issue the most accurate forecasts deliver more profitable stock 
recommendations. Financial analysts gather and evaluate large amounts of economic and financial data 
based on a number of stocks by examining their inherent values relative to their current market price. 
These results are then used to rate the investment probability of each stock to produce accurate stock 
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recommendations by financial analysts to benefit the individual investor (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee, 
2001).  
Investors are defined in nature by their investment objectives and strategies which are determined by risk 
adversity, time period, liquidity needs as well as tax implications. Investors make use of available market 
information and financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations to plot profitable investment 
strategies in anticipation excess returns. Investors often do not have access to stock related information, 
and even if they do, they may not be able to understand or accurately interpret this information. These 
investors may also not have access to the monetary outlay required to acquire necessary market 
information and therefore follow the stock recommendations of financial analysts with reputational 
confidence. The dependence of the investor on financial analysts’ forecasts and recommendations means 
that they should be as accurate as possible.  
Stock recommendations and forecasts by financial analysts are said to be efficient if they include all 
information available to the analyst in the market (Bradshaw 2011). However, in the recent past, research 
has observed that both financial analysts’ recommendations and forecasts are not always accurate and 
tend to be misleading to shareholders. Brown (1993) discusses the importance of better understanding 
the decision processes of financial analysts and the role of analysts’ forecasts and information processing 
in formulating stock recommendations. It is debatable whether analysts’ recommendations and forecasts 
are misleading because analysts are unethical or because predicting the future is difficult and no one can 
do it accurately.  
The problem is that although there is a lot of research carried out on financial analyst’s recommendations, 
there is a dearth of literature in emerging markets such as South Africa and we still do not know how the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) responds to financial analysts’ stock recommendations. It is important 
to understand the effect financial analysts’ new stock recommendations have on stock exchanges as 
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Barber et al. (2001) argue that investors can yield favourable returns from publicly available stock 
recommendations made by financial analysts. It is worth investigating whether investors in South African 
stocks listed on the JSE do actually benefit from analysts’ stock recommendations and yield more 
profitable returns based on analysts’ stock picking abilities as the literature may suggest. 
One of the biggest difficulties facing the investor as defined by Morgen and Stocken (2003) makes 
reference to the motives of the financial analyst issuing stock recommendations and the transparency of 
information provided. Research has continued to provide evidence that there is a positive correlation 
between analysts’ stock recommendations and stock price in the long-term, but there has been no 
certainty provided that it is profitable to act upon financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations 
as defined by Womack (1996).  
The accuracy of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and the efficacy of their stock recommendations 
continues to be questioned as Altinkilic, Balashov and Hansen (2013) claim that the announcement of 
analysts’ forecasts in the market results in little new information being introduced. These assumptions 
debunk the common belief that financial analysts are important market intermediaries (Loh and Mian, 
2006). Most of the research conducted on the role of financial analysts’ and their ability to provide 
investors with accurate forecasts and stock recommendations has focused on an American, Asian or 
European environment (Womack, 1996; Loh and Mian, 2006; Cheng, Liu and Qian, 2006; and Schipper, 
1991) with very little research focussing on the emerging African markets. Would events in emerging 
market economies be considered similar to market trends in developed markets or would they be 
considered separate due to the perception of isolated behaviour in these emerging market economies. It 
makes one wonder whether financial analyst’s behaviour is the same all over the world, and if their output 
in terms of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations should be taken with a pinch of salt.  
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The recent bankruptcy of African Bank Investments Limited (Abil) in South Africa is a case in point.  
South Africa’s largest unsecured lender’s share price plummeted in March 2014 when it announced 
interim financial losses of between R3.1bn and R3.3bn on the back of a rights issue it held in December 
2013 raising approximately R5.5bn from shareholders which many believed would save African Bank 
Investments Limited from the possibility of bankruptcy. 
(http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/financial/2014/05/06/how-capitec-finbond-pulled-away-from-abil 
accessed 24th October, 2014). 
Strangely, early in 2014, some financial analysts perceived Abil shares as a ‘strong buy’ implying that there 
was strong potential value seen for future stock returns. Although there had been a downward pressure 
on the shares of African Bank, not a single financial analyst rating the stock in Bloomberg had a ‘sell’ 
recommendation on the share. In fact, about three financial analysts rated African Bank ‘overweight’, 
another three ‘outperform’, one had a ‘neutral’ and three financial analysts recommended a new ‘buy’ 
position (http://africanbank.investorreports.com/abil-capitec-shares-remain-attractive-says-analysts/ 
accessed 28th October, 2014). Despite the glaring financial problems encountered by Abil the 
overwhelming majority of financial analysts were recommending that investors should buy African Bank 
shares. As the Abil share price nosedived, one of these analysts, Peter Mushangwe commented ‘I think 
it’s just sentiments around the unsecured lending’. An Imara SP Reid analyst Steve Meintjies, said that 
‘the prices right now are very attractive’ referring to both Abil and Capitec’s share price in June 2014 
(http://africanbank.investorreports.com/abil-capitec-shares-remain-attractive-says-analysts/ accessed 
28th October, 2014). 
The issue that has arisen on the back of the African Bank catastrophe is with the ‘expertise’ and resources 
that financial analysts have, why are they not able to accurately predict future share performances of 
stocks? We expect that financial analysts are privy to all available market information and through the 
examination of this information would be able to make accurate stock recommendations that would 
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benefit investors. It therefore appears that financial analysts are not able to continuously predict the 
future performance of stocks and are prone to the same heuristics and biases as the individual investor 
resulting in decreased profit as discussed by Jegadeesh (2004).  
Regardless of the new buy, hold or sell recommendations made by financial analysts, the worth  and the 
determination of the need for financial analysts is determined by their ability to assist investors in earning 
excess market returns based on their forecasts and recommendations in the financial market place.   
1.4 Research questions 
In order to assess the accuracy of financial analysts’ stock recommendations, this study focuses on three 
primary research questions in order to determine the accuracy of these stock recommendations issued 
by financial analysts and how these stocks perform on the back of financial analysts’ recommendations. 
The following questions are derived from the research problem previously discussed.   
 Do financial analysts new buy recommendations outperform the benchmark in the subsequent 
period after the change is made? 
 Do analysts new sell recommendations underperform the benchmark in the subsequent period 
after the change is made? 
 Do analysts buy and sell recommendations destruct or create value for investors? 
1.5 Research objectives  
The objective of this study is to determine if new buy recommendations from financial analysts 
outperform the industry benchmark in the period following the change, do these new sell 
recommendations underperform the benchmark in the period subsequent to the change and finally, do 
financial analysts buy and sell recommendations destruct or create value for individual investors resulting 
in wealth creation for shareholders.  
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1.6 Significance of the study 
This study aims to add value to the extant literature available regarding the accuracy of financial analysts’ 
forecasts and stock recommendations from a South African perspective. South Africa is considered the 
economic capital of Africa and offers investors a multitude of investment incentives and opportunities. 
This study is relevant for a number of reasons: firstly, most research on the accuracy of financial analysts' 
forecasts and stock recommendations relates to the United States, Asian and European markets with little 
research produced from markets outside of these regions and two, there has been and remains little 
research applied to the effects of financial analysts’ stock recommendations in emerging market 
economies such as South Africa. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) - the largest traded exchange in Africa formed in 1887 and ranks 
19th globally as one of the largest stock exchanges based on market capitalization and is the largest 
securities exchange in Africa. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange offers investors access to efficient 
primary and secondary capital markets across an assorted range of financial securities and is regulated 
accordingly by post-trade and supervisory services (http://jse.co.za accessed 5th November, 2014). 
This report will benefit individual investors trading stocks in the South African market to better understand 
the value of financial analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations and to determine whether there is 
value found in adhering to these recommendations and developing investment strategies.   
1.7 Organization of thesis 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the extant literature on financial 
analysts and their role within capital markets. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology used in this 
report. Chapter 4 presents the results. Chapter 5 concludes the report with a discussion of the results and 
the paper.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the extant literature on stock recommendations and forecasts made by financial 
analysts. The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 discusses the role of the financial analyst. Section 
2.3 presents the performance of analysts’ stock recommendations and forecasts. Section 2.4 illustrates 
the accuracy of financial analysts’ stock recommendations and forecasts. Section 2.5 discusses financial 
analysts and behavioural finance. Section 2.6 presents the idea of market efficiency and chapter summary 
concludes. 
2.2 The role of the financial analyst 
The increasing popularity of stock markets in emerging market economies together with increased 
participation in these markets by individual investors has seen an increase in the production and 
consumption of financial information and literature. Share trading information is presented to investors 
by financial analysts in the form of earnings forecasts and new buy, hold and sell stock recommendations.  
The role of the financial analyst is to gather data focused on a company or industry and analyse market 
trends to provide investors with accurate earnings forecasts resulting in profitable stock 
recommendations (Loh & Mian, 2006). Financial analysts make use of all available information referencing 
quantitative behavioural trends as well as internal and external factors that may influence a stock in order 
to provide sound investment forecasts and asset allocation recommendations. Schipper (1991) defines 
the role of the financial analyst by stating the purpose of the financial analyst is to provide investors with 
new buy, hold or sell recommendations and generate accurate reports to support these new stock 
recommendations. Financial analysts use their forecasts in addition to available market information to 
approximate the value of a security in the market. The financial analyst then compares the price at which 
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the security is currently trading with their forecast and provides investors with a new buy, hold or sell 
stock recommendation (Bradshaw 2004).   
Trueman (1994) examines the purpose of the financial analyst and proposes that financial analysts 
dependent on their financial reporting abilities such as stock recommendations and forecasts are driven 
to foster reputations built on recommendation accuracy. Trueman (1994) proposes that financial analysts 
with sound abilities continuously reveal all available market information candidly whilst weaker financial 
analysts attempt to mimic the recommendations and forecasts of others and past performances. The role 
of the financial analyst is defended by Martinez (2011) who emphasizes the role played by the financial 
analyst as a gatekeeper set to reduce information asymmetry between financial firms and individual 
investors in the market.  
There are two types of financial analysts found in the market namely sell-side analysts and buy-side 
analysts. This research report will focus on sell-side analysts. Sell-side analysts often work for a brokerage 
firm providing research, earnings forecasts and stock recommendations to brokers, client’s and the public. 
The findings produced by these analysts are recognized as having investment value to the individual 
investor as discussed by Cheng, Liu and Qian (2006).  
A buy-side analyst is employed by a financial management firm primarily mutual funds, hedge funds and 
investment advisory firms to make recommendations and forecasts exclusively for internal use. The 
financial information provided by the buy-side analyst is not for use by the public and is often proprietary 
possession of the financial firm or employer and therefore is of no use in this report. If the accuracy of the 
sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations and the value relevance of the stock are considered to be 
related, the identification of expert financial analysts’ producing accurate investment strategies will prove 
to be a fruitful investigation as discussed by Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008) leading to increased investor 
wealth based on new buy, hold and sell recommendations issued by the financial analysts. 
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The extant literature demonstrates the importance of the financial analyst and the service provided to 
market investors. Sell-side analysts continuously collect, monitor and examine all information available in 
the market such as financial statements, annual reports, stock reports and estimates as well as past 
behaviour and trends in order to present individual investors with a comprehensive and informed stock 
recommendation as defined by Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009).  
2.3 The value of financial analysts’ stock recommendations and forecasts 
Loh and Mian (2006) determined that financial analysts that produce accurate forecasts resulting in 
increased market return are considered to have superior inputs and yield preferable recommendations 
resulting in enhanced levels of investor confidence in the abilities of the financial analyst. Bradshaw (2004) 
surmises that the intrinsic worth of the financial analyst is determined by their ability to accurately direct 
investors towards stocks that will result in excess market returns. Ultimately the value proposition of the 
financial analyst is held in the eye of the investor.  
Often investors track the investment performance of stock recommendations made by financial analysts 
in an effort to earn abnormal market returns as the financial analyst is believed to have access to market 
information that the individual investor does not as discussed by Cliff (2007). Investors often do not have 
the knowledge or realise the consequences of investing in a particular stock in the market and rely heavily 
on the recommendations made by a trusted financial analyst for guidance. In many situations the 
economic environment which the investor hopes to penetrate is complex and investors are not certain on 
the impact of their decisions. Investors seek advice from financial experts such as analysts to yield excess 
returns proving profitable for the individual investor (Morgan & Stocken, 2003). Research supports both 
the value proposition offered through the stock recommendations made by financial analysts as well as 
the opinion held by many such as Cliff (2007); Womack (1996); Easterwood & Nutt (1999); and Mokoaleli-
Mokoteli, Taffler & Argawal (2009) who question if there is any value to be extracted from the predictions 
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made by financial analysts in the market. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) propose that stock 
recommendations made by financial analysts are considered irrational and insufficient, and fail to take 
into account new information available to analysts in the market timeously. This results in the possibility 
that financial analysts are subject to the misinterpretation of earnings information which in turn affect 
their forecasts and stock recommendations. The literature suggests that there is inefficiency within 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts resulting in an upward bias and a misrepresentation of available 
market information (Easterwood & Nutt, 1999).  
2.4 Financial analysts and behavioural finance  
Financial analysts make use of heuristics also referred to as rules of thumb to guide them in determining 
which action has the highest probability of being the correct choice in a particular situation. Mokoaleli-
Mokoteli, Taffler and Agarwal (2009) found that financial analysts that produced non-conforming 
forecasts and stock recommendations were often identified as being associated with overconfidence bias 
and representativeness bias.  
Overconfidence bias suggests that the analyst has become too confident in their stock picking abilities and 
their capability to produce accurate forecast earnings and stock recommendations. This results in 
irrational behaviour by the financial analysts. The effect of overconfidence bias results in an analysts’ 
subjective confidence in his or her judgement becoming consistently greater than the objective accuracy 
of those judgements. Overconfidence bias may result in a delayed response to the market by analysts 
causing investors to adjust to new market information at a delayed rate and subject to stock price 
fluctuations. This would be evident in a post event drift in stock prices in the market. Overconfidence may 
provide a plausible explanation as to why financial analysts believe that they have superior stock picking 
abilities compared to individual investors when their stock recommendations often result in limited 
investment value (Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler & Agarwal, 2009).   
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Behavioural finance is replete with a number of biases that affect investment decisions that one should 
be aware of. Representativeness bias from a financial perspective refers to judgements made by the 
analyst that take into account the classification or categorization of a person, place or thing. This 
psychological bias is manifested when a limited number of traits or characteristics of an individual, object 
or situation are measured and immediately classified based upon predefined stereotypes often causing 
financial analysts to see patterns in data that is strictly random and develop assumptions based on 
inconclusive information (Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, Taffler & Agarwal, 2009).  
The literature further discusses key behavioural finance concept that affects financial experts referred to 
as prospect theory. Prospect theory suggests that analysts value gains and losses on a varying degree, and 
as such base their investment decisions on perceived gains and not on potential losses (Scott, Stumpp and 
Zu, 1999). It is therefore unanimously concluded that financial analysts are inclined to be optimistic and 
subject to a number of cognitive biases that need to be taken into account when assessing the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts and stock recommendations. Financial analysts’ forecasted earnings and stock 
recommendations are often higher than the actual market results obtained by investors in the market 
(Martinez 2011).  
Brown (1993) proposes that the combined efforts of financial market researchers and behaviourists in 
examining available market information will augment our understanding of the role of the financial 
analyst in the price formation process and evaluate the accuracy of these results.  
2.5 Market efficiency  
Fama (1998) defines an efficient market as a market in which a large number of rational profit-maximizers 
actively compete with one another in order to predict future market values of stocks. He concludes that 
it would be impossible for financial analysts to continuously beat the market and earn excess returns 
based upon current information available to market participants. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
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theory states that when markets are considered efficient, stock prices will fully reflect all publicly available 
information challenging the role of the financial analyst in the stock market and the accuracy of their 
recommendations allowing investors to exploit the predictability of the market. If capital markets are seen 
to be efficient, market prices and financial analysts’ forecasts and recommendations are believed to 
reflect all available market information which would result in arbitrage (Ramnath, Rock and Shane, 2008).  
Loh and Mian (2006) suggest that imperfectly efficient markets reward financial analysts for their costly 
activities like information gathering in an effort to generate superior stock recommendations. The 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) theory states that stock market prices are determined by a discounting 
process that results in stock prices equalling the present value of the expected future cash flows and that 
all available information is priced into the market and fully reflected as weak form, semi-strong form or 
strong form. Financial analysts’ stock recommendations deliver information surrounding future cash flows 
to the market and are often the primary determinants of stock valuations. 
In an attempt to identify high-performance assets that will most likely lead to increased returns; analysts 
evaluate stock prices and then turn a profit by selling stock that appears to be overvalued, whilst buying 
stock that seems undervalued. Hens (2002) observed that stock prices cannot reflect all available 
information in its entirety all the time. If all factors were priced into the share price, there would be no 
need for financial analysts and the information provided by these analysts.  
Financial analysts recognise that in order to provide a service warranting compensation within the 
financial sector; markets have to be considered inefficient to a degree (Hens, 2002). The concept of market 
inefficiency concludes that the market price of stocks is not always completely accurately priced; with all 
factors affecting the price both internally and externally accounted for within the current stock price (Loh 
and Mian, 2006).     
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2.6 Chapter summary  
In order to fully understand the role of financial analysts in the stock market and the accuracy of their 
stock recommendations an understanding of the literature surrounding analysts as well as financial theory 
is necessary. The role of the financial analyst, the accuracy of financial analysts’ stock recommendations 
and forecasts, behavioural finance conditions and market efficiency was discussed in this chapter in order 
to examine the data collected and presented in Chapter 4 through statistical analysis. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to establish if financial analysts’ new buy, hold or sell recommendations 
outperform the benchmark in the subsequent period after the change is made and whether these 
recommendations create or destruct value for individual investors. 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the research methodology used in the collection and 
organisation of the data needed to address the research problems identified in this study and is organized 
as follows: section 3.2 presents the data required and the data sources. Section 3.3 discusses the research 
design and section 3.4 concludes the chapter with a chapter summary.  
3.2 Data and data sources 
This study examines data extracted from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and the FTSE/JSE All 
Share Index using Bloomberg Professional - an investment-based software programme providing real-
time financial data.  The JSE lists approximately 400 companies dependent on listings. The data is 
examined over a 10 year period from 2003 to 2013 to determine a suitable sample of firms, their share 
price and the financial analysts’ new buy, hold or sell recommendation made on the firm’s stock. The 
sample group will include data during and post the fall of the global markets in 2008 referred to as the 
credit crisis in order to yield conclusive results from periods of market volatility as well as maintain 
consistency. The data looks to establish if the cross-sectional distribution of abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns at the time of the event are systematically different from the predicted 
returns. The long-term assessment of market data will provide a full valuation of the accuracy and effects 
of financial analyst’s stock recommendations on the JSE. 
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The data presented will assess the markets’ reaction to stocks listed on the JSE based on the new buy, 
hold and sell position recommended by financial analysts and the effect that the change in 
recommendation had on the JSE. The stock recommendations will be obtained from Bloomberg and will 
be coded as follows: 1 is a new sell recommendation, 2 is a new hold recommendation and 3 is a new buy 
recommendation. A sample of 29 listed firms was used based on the period from 2003 to 2013. This 
sample was determined by date of listing, closing price data, availability of financial analysts’ stock 
recommendations and the consistency of available data within a 6 month event period.    
A benchmark is necessary as an industry standard against which the stock data will be compared. The 
FTSE/JSE All Share Index also referred to as the JALSH is a market capitalization-weighted index which 
tracks the performance of all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa. The 
FTSE/JSE Index is representative of the performance of all listed South African firms providing investors 
with an overview of the South African market and its historical and current temperament.  
3.3 Research design 
The aim of this research report is to assess the effect of financial analysts’ stock recommendations on the 
JSE. Event study methodology is used to evaluate the impact of an event on the share price of a listed 
security. An event study typically examines return behaviour for a sample of firms experiencing a 
collective event. Event study methodology makes the assumption that the stock market is efficient and 
that the price of listed stocks are inclusive of all the relevant information available (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997) and as a result has become a popular research paradigm in both economic and financial literature 
(Henderson 1990).  
Event study methodology is used in this study as the primary quantitative practice to measure the 
accuracy and effective of financial analysts’ new buy, hold and sell recommendations. The methods used 
during an event study are well-suited to measuring the impact of market-wide events such as financial 
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analysts’ new stock recommendations and the effect they have on stock prices to determine whether or 
not there is an abnormal return caused by the financial analysts’ stock recommendation. The return on a 
stock reflects ups and downs experienced in the market.  
The return of each listed stock on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange will be calculated to examine the 
initial value of the stock compared to the final value of the stock to determine if the financial analysts’ 
recommendation was accurate and had an effect on the stock in the market. The return of the stock is 
calculated by subtracting the initial value of the stock from the final value of the stock and then dividing 
it by the initial value of the given stock.  
3.3.1 Calculating returns 
The price data for all the shares is converted into returns data using the following formula. The formula is 
used to calculate monthly returns. 
𝑟 =
𝑃1 − 𝑃0
𝑃0
 
P1 = final value of the stock 
P0= initial value of the stock 
3.3.2 The benchmark for expected returns 
The FTSE/JSE All Share Index is the chosen benchmark as it does not exclude any particular sector of the 
market and provides a standard to which the sample stock data can be comparatively assessed. This 
market index represents 99% of the full market capital value of all main board stocks listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
3.3.3 Calculating abnormal returns 
The abnormal return of a stock is then determined based on the expected return of the stock and is 
calculated as the difference between the expected return (market benchmark) of a stock and the actual 
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return to determine the general movement of the sample firms’ stock returns from the market benchmark  
stock returns as per the equation below. The abnormal return is examined in order to compare the 
distributions of the actual returns with that of the predicted returns and whether the returns are the same 
(Khotari and Warner 2006). This event study will see the focus placed on the mean and median of the 
distribution of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns.  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑟𝐴𝑏) = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑟𝐴) −  𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑟𝐸) 
 
3.3.4 Calculating cumulative abnormal returns 
 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is derived to determine the value of the investment and the effect 
of the event on stock prices in the market. CAR uses the sum of the differences between the estimated 
return on a stock and the actual return of the stock to evaluate the impact of new market information or 
the event on the stock price resulting in a new buy, hold or sell recommendation by financial analysts.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
The sum of the abnormal returns on security ἰ from period t1 to period t2, where T1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T2. 
The t-statistic and p-values are used to assess the performance and significance of the abnormal returns 
and cumulative abnormal returns during a 6 month period following the change in recommendation. The 
t-test was used to test the CAR mean returns of the sample firms against the FTSE/JSE All Share Index as 
the selected benchmark to determine if new buy recommendations lead to the outperformance of the 
market benchmark in the period following the recommendation or if the new sell recommendations lead 
to underperformance in the period following the recommendation. Significance testing was done at a 10% 
level of significance.  
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3.4 Chapter summary  
Descriptive and quantitative research methods are used in this study. Descriptive statistics will be used to 
provide a report of the population and the final sample of selected stocks. A quantitative approach is then 
used to determine the stock returns and benchmark returns. Event study methodology is the primary 
quantitative methodology used in this report to assess the financial effect of the selected events.  
This chapter sought to describe the data, data sources, research design and methodology used in this 
report. Chapter 3 provides an understanding of the analysis used to generate the results examined and 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. Chapter 4 will evaluate the data obtained in this study and provide 
an in-depth examination of the data through statistical analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Results Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the results of the analysis of the accuracy of financial analysts’ 
stock recommendations and on stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). This chapter is 
organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics: Section 4.3 discusses the findings: 
Finally section 4.4 concludes the discussion of the results. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Illustrating Stock Returns and Market Index Returns on the JSE 
Panel 1: Stock Performance 
Recommendation Variables Mean Median Min Max Std Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Sell SR 0.002 -0.001 -0.431 0.291 0.105 -0.211 1.367 
 AR -0.014 -0.008 -0.351 0.277 0.095 -0.245 1.206 
 CAR -0.063 -0.054 -0.815 0.503 0.193 -0.362 1.655 
Hold SR 0.012 0.01 -0.401 0.676 0.108 0.481 4.03 
 AR -0.001 -0.006 -0.399 0.733 0.102 0.851 6.848 
 CAR -0.006 -0.019 -1.19 0.948 0.228 -0.117 4.803 
Buy SR 0.006 0 -0.319 0.535 0.097 0.636 2.89 
 AR -0.005 -0.015 -0.287 0.509 0.084 0.702 3.791 
 CAR -0.014 -0.012 -0.821 0.636 0.176 -0.041 2.872 
Panel 2: Index Performance 
    IR 0.013 0.014 -0.14   0.14 0.05 -0.077 0.174 
 
*SR = stock return; AR = abnormal returns; CAR = cumulative abnormal return and IR = benchmark index return 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics derived from the abnormal returns for new buy, hold and sell 
recommendations made by financial analysts. Panel 1 in Table 1 shows the stock returns for the new sell 
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recommendations issued by financial analysts. The mean of the new sell recommendations is 0.002 whilst 
the mean for the index return in Table 1 Panel 2 is 0.013. The median of the new sell recommendation 
stock return is -0.001 in Panel 1 Table 1 and the median for the index return in Table 1 Panel 2 is 0.014. 
The minimum return for the new sell recommendation is -0.431 as seen in Panel 1 Table 2. The minimum 
for the index return is -0.14. The maximum observed value for the new sell recommendation is 0.291 
whilst the maximum for the index return is -0.14. The standard deviation of the stock return for the new 
sell recommendation is 0.105 and 0.05 for the index return indicating that the stock return is more volatile 
than the index return. The skewness of the stock return is -0.211 with a kurtosis of 1.367. The index return 
skewness is -0.077 with a kurtosis of 0.174 in Table 1 Panel 2 indicating that the market was skewed to 
the left. 
The new buy recommendation in Table 1 Panel 1 made by financial analysts has a stock return mean of 
0.006 compared to an index return mean of 0.013. The minimum for the stock return is -0.319 with a 
maximum of 0.535. The stock return has a standard deviation of 0.097. The index return has a lower 
standard deviation at 0.05 compared to that of the stock return 0.097 resulting in higher volatility of the 
stock return. The skewness of the stock return in Table 1 Panel 1 is 0.636 showing the stock return is 
skewed to the right. 
The new hold recommendation issued by financial analysts has a mean of 0.012 shown in Table 1 Panel 1 
compared to the mean of the index return of 0.013 in Table 1 Panel 2. The median of the new hold 
recommendation is 0.01 whilst the median for index return is 0.014. The standard deviation for the new 
hold recommendation is 0.0108 and 0.05 for the index return. The skewness for the stock return for the 
new hold recommendations is 0.481 with an excess kurtosis of 4.03. The index return is near to a normal 
distribution with a skewness of -0.117 and an excess kurtosis of 4.238. 
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4.3 Performance of analysts’ recommendations 
This section examines the performance of new buy, hold and sell recommendations made by financial 
analysts through the analysis of the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns subsequent to 
the change in recommendation. 
 Table 2: Performance of New Buy Recommendations on the JSE from January 2003 to December 2013 
 Period Mean Median t Value Pr > |t| 
Panel 1: Abnormal Returns 
0 -0.0124 -0.0146 -1.0900 0.2796 
1 0.0096 0.0087 0.9400 0.3510 
2 0.0086 -0.0023 0.7100 0.4815 
3 -0.0040 -0.0195 -0.3600 0.7208 
4 -0.0264 -0.0212 -2.8000 0.0072 
5 -0.0046 -0.0194 -0.3100 0.7589 
6 -0.0067 -0.0134 -0.6100 0.5455 
Panel 2: Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
0 -0.0124 -0.0146 -1.0900 0.2796 
1 -0.0028 -0.0043 -0.1800 0.8554 
2 0.0058 0.0028 0.3100 0.7606 
3 0.0018 0.0238 0.0900 0.9322 
4 -0.0246 -0.0120 -1.0100 0.3181 
5 -0.0292 -0.0361 -0.9200 0.3626 
6 -0.0359 -0.0444 -0.9700 0.3379 
 
Table 2 presents the performance of new buy recommendations made by financial analysts on the month 
that the recommendation changed and in the subsequent 6 months following the change in 
recommendation. Panel 1 in Table 2 illustrates that the new buy recommendations were largely negative 
(mean -0.0124) albeit not significant on the recommendation month (month 0). This implies that the 
market did not see financial analysts’ buy recommendations in a positive manner. In the 6 months 
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following the new buy recommendation, the results are largely negative and significantly so in month 4 
(mean -0.0264) further indicating that the market did not believe in the financial analysts buy 
recommendations. Panel 2 in Table 2 presents the cumulative abnormal returns which are not too 
different from those found in Panel 1. The results discussed in Table 2 are graphically represented in Graph 
1 and Graph 2 below.  
Graph 1: Graph Showing the Performance of the Abnormal Returns for New Buy Recommendations  
Graph 2: Graph Showing the Performance of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for New Buy 
Recommendations 
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Table 3: Performance of New Hold Recommendations on the JSE from January 2003 to December 2013 
 Period Mean Median t Value Pr > |t| 
Panel 1: Abnormal Returns 
0 -0.0181 -0.0211 -2.1000 0.0388 
1 0.0123 0.0006 1.3400 0.1848 
2 0.0015 -0.0124 0.1500 0.8844 
3 0.0045 -0.0237 0.3100 0.7579 
4 0.0013 0.0139 0.1300 0.8977 
5 -0.0074 -0.0050 -0.7300 0.4667 
6 -0.0042 0.0047 -0.3500 0.7244 
Panel 2: Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns 
0 -0.0181 -0.0211 -2.1000 0.0388 
1 -0.0057 -0.0190 -0.4200 0.6780 
2 -0.0042 -0.0190 -0.2300 0.8207 
3 0.0003 -0.0145 0.0100 0.9909 
4 0.0016 -0.0149 0.0600 0.9543 
5 -0.0058 0.0124 -0.1800 0.8555 
6 -0.0100 -0.0167 -0.3000 0.7664 
 
Table 3 presents the performance of new hold recommendations made by financial analysts on the month 
that the recommendation changed and in the subsequent 6 months following the change in 
recommendation. Panel 1 in Table 3 shows that the new hold recommendations’ abnormal returns are 
predominately positive (mean 0.0123) for periods 1 to 4 illustrating that the new hold recommendations 
made by financial analysts’ over performed during this period following the change in recommendation 
(month 0) albeit statistically insignificant from Period 1 to 6. This implies that the market did see value in 
the new hold recommendations made by financial analysts’ and that the abnormal returns outperformed 
the market. In the subsequent 6 months following the change in recommendation, the results are mostly 
positive and only statistically significant for Period 0 (mean -0.0181) at the 5% level of significance (p-value 
0.0388). Panel 2 in Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns which are mainly negative (-0.0181) 
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and statistically insignificant aside from Period 0 (-0.0181) in comparison to the largely positive abnormal 
returns found in Panel 1. This suggests that the cumulative abnormal returns of the new hold 
recommendations underperformed the market. The results discussed in Table 3 are graphically 
represented in Graph 3 and Graph 4 below. 
Graph 3: Graph Showing the Performance of the Abnormal Returns for New Hold Recommendations  
 
Graph 4: Graph Showing the Performance of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for New Hold 
Recommendations 
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Table 4: Performance of New Sell Recommendations on the JSE from January 2003 to December 2013 
 Period Mean Median t Value Pr > |t| 
Panel 1: Abnormal Returns 
0 -0.0198 0.0046 -1.0400 0.3031 
1 -0.0262 -0.0129 -1.6400 0.1082 
2 -0.0103 -0.0159 -0.6600 0.5135 
3 -0.0154 -0.0123 -1.1400 0.2598 
4 0.0011 0.0011 0.0800 0.9378 
5 -0.0114 0.0074 -0.9400 0.3506 
6 -0.0159 -0.0083 -1.0800 0.2849 
Panel 2: Cumulative Abnormal 
Return 
0 -0.0198 0.0046 -1.0400 0.3031 
1 -0.0460 -0.0326 -1.8800 0.0678 
2 -0.0563 -0.0387 -2.3200 0.0255 
3 -0.0717 -0.0661 -2.5100 0.0164 
4 -0.0706 -0.0902 -2.0100 0.0509 
5 -0.0820 -0.1058 -2.3000 0.0268 
6 -0.0979 -0.0817 -2.3600 0.0236 
 
Table 4 presents the performance of new sell recommendations made by financial analysts on the month 
that the recommendation changed and in the subsequent 6 months following the change in 
recommendation. Panel 1 in Table 4 illustrates that the abnormal returns for the new sell 
recommendations made by analysts were largely negative for both abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns and statistically insignificant at the 10% level of significance. The new sell 
recommendations made by financial analysts allows for the assumption that the stock will underperform 
the market benchmark resulting in negative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns. This is in 
line with the expectation that the negative abnormal returns would indicate a new sell recommendation. 
Although Table 4 Panel 1 yielded negative abnormal returns, the p-values indicate that the new sell 
recommendations are statistically insignificant. This implies that the market did not see value in the new 
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sell recommendations issued by the financial analysts. In the 6 months following the new sell 
recommendation, the results are all negative with the exception of Period 4 (mean 0.0011), showing that 
the results underperformed the market benchmark overall. Panel 2 in Table 4 presents the cumulative 
abnormal returns which are not too different from those discussed in Panel 1 albeit statistically significant 
from Period 1 to 6. This infers that the market, based on the cumulative abnormal returns, did see analysts 
new sell recommendations in a positive manner. The results discussed in Table 4 are graphically 
represented in Graph 5 and Graph 6 below. 
Graph 5: Graph Showing the Performance of the Abnormal Returns for New Sell Recommendations  
Graph 6: Graph Showing the Performance of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for New Sell 
Recommendations 
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4.4 Chapter summary 
The results based on the new buy recommendations issued by financial analysts’ were mainly insignificant 
and underperformed compared to the market benchmark suggesting the market did not react positively 
to new buy recommendations. The results for the new hold recommendations made by financial analysts 
largely outperformed the market benchmark albeit mainly insignificant. The new sell recommendations 
issued by analysts continuously underperformed the market benchmark and were significant only in 
relation to abnormal returns.  
The results in this chapter determined whether the new buy, hold or sell recommendation issued by 
financial analysts underperformed or outperformed the market benchmark. Based upon this performance 
and the level of significance it was concluded that the market responded positively or negatively to the 
new recommendation made by financial analysts. This is to be expected based on the extant literature 
that suggests that financial analysts cannot continuously beat the market by predicting excess returns 
enhancing investor wealth (Fama, 1988). 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to determine if new buy, hold and sell recommendation made by financial 
analysts underperformed or outperformed the market benchmark in the period following the change in 
recommendation. The new recommendation was identified and the abnormal returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns examined to identify if financial analysts’ stock recommendations create or destruct 
wealth for the individual investor. 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss and compare the results of this study with the findings made in 
related research. This chapter concludes the study and proposes recommendations for future research. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 examines the findings, section 5.3 concludes the study 
and finally, section 5.4 presents recommendations for future research.  
5.2 Findings 
If markets are seen to be efficient then share prices and financial analysts’ stock recommendations are 
believed to reflect all available market information which would result in arbitrage as discussed by 
Ramnath, Rock and Shane (2008). The extant literature by Womack (1996), Cliff (2004) and Loh and Mian 
(2006) proposed that new buy recommendations issued by financial analysts will outperform the market 
benchmark and create value for investors. The results of this study found that this was not the case for 
stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The new buy recommendations issued by financial 
analysts from January 2003 to December 2013 on stocks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were 
largely negative (in relation to the mean of the abnormal returns) and insignificant (p-values). The new 
buy recommendations underperformed the market benchmark (FTSE/JSE All Share Index) in the 
subsequent period following the change in recommendation. Only month four was significant thereby 
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demonstrating value creation from analyst recommendations (p-value is significant). The new buy 
recommendations issued by financial analysts largely did not create value for the individual investor 
suggesting that financial analysts cannot continue to beat the market as discussed by Easterwood and 
Nutt (1999) and Fama (1988) who recognized that financial analysts fail to take into account available 
information in the market timeously.  
The abnormal returns for the new hold recommendations outperformed the market benchmark whilst 
the cumulative abnormal returns did not. The abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns were 
both found to be not significant for the most part as was the case with the new buy recommendations (p-
values). This brings to light that there is the chance that financial analysts can create shareholder wealth 
as discussed in contention by Cheng, Liu and Qian (2006) and Barber et al. (2001).  
Financial analysts issue new sell recommendations when shares are believed to lose future value. This 
study shows that new sell recommendations issued by financial analysts underperform the market 
benchmark illustrated by the means of the abnormal returns but are not significant (p-values). In the 
financial literature Loh and Mian (2006), Bradshaw (2011) and Womack (2006) provide evidence that 
there is a positive relationship between the accuracy of financial analysts’ stock recommendations and 
stock prices. The results of this study further suggest that there is no certainty provided that it is 
continuously profitable to act on financial analysts’ stock recommendations as discussed by Womack 
(1996).  
5.3 Conclusion 
In issuing new buy, hold and sell recommendations financial analysts clearly define their expectations 
around the future stock performance of a given firm. This report finds that financial analysts cannot 
continuously exploit market inefficiencies significantly through new stock recommendations and active 
investment strategies. According to the results of this study, it cannot be explicity accepted that new buy, 
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hold or sell recommendations made by financial analysts outperform the market based on the level of 
significance of the results.  
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
There is a dearth of literature surrounding financial analysts’ stock recommendations and the effect these 
stock recommendations have on emerging economies. It is recommended that in order to further 
understand the role of the financial analyst in emerging market economies this study be applied to other 
African countries with active investment opportunity and a listed securities exchange. 
Further research incorporating financial regulations surrounding the recommendations made by financial 
analysts would add further value to this study as this study made evident that financial analysts do not 
consistently beat the market. Closely related to this notion, Bradshaw (2011) suggests that financial 
analysts’ behaviour in the market is dominated by conflicts of interest such as financial incentives and not 
the accurateness of their results thereby suggesting that financial analysts do not always report candidly 
on shares in the market due to financial reward or incentive. It would be interesting to examine the 
regulation and restraints applied to financial analysts as this study has shown that financial analysts 
cannot continuously outperform the market. The literature exhaustively discussed whether financial 
analysts are biased upwards for personal gain or pure prediction error has occurred negatively affecting 
new buy, hold and sell recommendations issued by the financial analysts.  
 The sample size was a challenge as it was difficult to find listed shares trading on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange from January 2003 to December 2013 consistent with the parameters set in this study; namely 
the trading period and the frequency of the financial analysts’ recommendations. Analysts are employed 
to follow predefined stocks and produce reports on these shares. If there is little interest in the share 
trading on the exchange there is likely to be no consistent financial analysts’ ratings or recommendations 
within a 6 month period applied to such shares. It may be beneficial to include additional traded 
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exchanges from other African countries to draw a comparison against, increase the sample size and 
further the research found in this report.  
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